1. Introduction: cross-border communications in an era of global crises and conflicts

Over the past decades the architecture of global communications has changed fundamentally. Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit (NGSO) constellations — for example, SpaceX's Starlink system — have made it possible to deliver fast broadband internet access almost anywhere on Earth. This technology was bound to collide with the settled norms of international law, whose core principle is the drive of states to extend their sovereignty over the radio-frequency spectrum just as they already hold it over national communications.

This contradiction is especially acute where emergency circumstances prevail: war, mass unrest, natural disasters. In such conditions, access to information becomes a matter of survival and of protecting fundamental human rights. Authoritarian governments and warring parties often deliberately shut down the internet (internet shutdowns) in order to retain political control, suppress dissent and conceal human-rights violations. In response, entrepreneurs such as Elon Musk propose to bypass the absurd restrictions invented by authoritarian governments, and promise to hand out satellite terminals directly to the population so that communication is never interrupted.

Let us examine the legal grounds, international agreements and norms that govern cross-border satellite communications — how lawful it is to supply Starlink terminals to Iran while internal blocks are in force there, and weigh how international telecommunications law, space law, human-rights doctrine and disaster-relief conventions relate to one another.

2. Applicable normative legal acts

To grasp the legal environment of satellite communications in full, let us build a logical hierarchy of international treaties, conventions and national acts. The table below gathers the main documents on which the legality of communications under emergency circumstances depends.

3. Regulation of the radio-frequency spectrum: an architecture of sovereignty

Any wireless communication — from a mobile phone to a satellite terminal — operates on electromagnetic waves, that is, it uses the radio-frequency spectrum. The spectrum is limited: on a single frequency in a single area, two transmitters cannot operate at the same time without interfering with each other. That is why international law sees the spectrum not as an ownerless free expanse that anyone may use for profit, but as a limited shared resource that has to be divided and coordinated among states.

This logic is enshrined in the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Already in its preamble the Constitution recognizes the sovereign right of every state to regulate its telecommunication. One of the Union's principal tasks is to allocate the radio-frequency spectrum, assign frequencies and register frequency assignments so as to avoid harmful interference between the radio stations of different countries. And Article 44 directly classes radio frequencies and the associated satellite orbits as limited natural resources: they must be used rationally, efficiently and economically — in such a way that all countries have equitable access to them.

3.1. The role of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

The world's radio-frequency spectrum is managed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the UN. The ITU's main task is to prevent harmful interference between the communication systems of different states. The ITU proceeds from the premise that the spectrum is a limited, non-renewable resource that must be shared equitably, taking account of everyone's needs, including those of developing countries.

The right to frequencies is obtained in several stages — this is how the so-called warehousing of spectrum (spectrum warehousing), where frequencies are reserved but not used, is meant to be prevented. A member state of the ITU (the notifying administration) submits Advance Publication Information (API) to the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau, then coordinates frequencies with the affected countries, and if coordination succeeds, the frequency assignment is entered in the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR). An entry in the MIFR confers international recognition and protection from harmful interference. For non-geostationary systems (NGSO) a phased schedule applies in a number of bands (Resolution 35): after a seven-year bring-into-use period the operator must deploy 10% of the constellation within two years, 50% within five years and 100% within seven; those who fail to meet the schedule retain rights in the register only for as many satellites as they have actually placed in orbit.

3.2. The imperative of Article 18.1 of the Radio Regulations

International recognition of frequencies at the ITU is often mistakenly taken for a worldwide licence to provide services. But the ITU does not issue commercial licences. The right to operate commercially (landing rights) remains exclusively with each individual state.

The chief constraint on cross-border communications is Article 18 of the ITU Radio Regulations (an international treaty binding on all signatory countries). Paragraph 18.1 reads: "No transmitting station may be established or operated by a private person or by any enterprise without a licence issued in an appropriate form and in conformity with the provisions of these Regulations by or on behalf of the government of the country to which the station in question is subject."

A satellite terminal (for example, a Starlink user antenna) is not merely a passive receiver; it is a transmitting earth station that sends a signal up to orbit (uplink). The satellite is in space, but the terminal itself stands on the sovereign territory of a particular state. Therefore, without the authorization of the local government, its operation violates the domestic legislation of that country that implements its assumed international obligations — whatever the operator's intentions.

In addition, Resolutions 22 and 25 (as revised at the World Radiocommunication Conference WRC-23; Res 25 originates from WRC-03) oblige administrations that license global satellite systems to ensure that operators limit unauthorized transmissions from earth stations where no authorization exists.

3.3. National licensing: a comparative analysis using Germany as an example

The principle of sovereignty in Article 18.1 carries over into the national legislation of all developed countries. To understand how this works, let us examine the legislation of Germany.

In Germany the spectrum is administered by the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA). Under § 91 of the Telecommunications Act (TKG) any radio frequencies for satellite communications must first be obtained as a frequency assignment, while the satellite-specific rules are set out in § 95 TKG. The procedure is strict:

• the frequencies must be allocated to the satellite service in the Frequency Allocation Table;
• the applicant must prove that it uses the spectrum responsibly and creates no interference (including to radio-astronomy observatories and radio-monitoring stations — for example, the BNetzA station at Leeheim);
• one-time fees and annual interference-protection contributions (FSBeitrV) are charged for the licence.

For mobile satellite systems (S-PCS), where transmission is controlled by the network operator itself (Inmarsat, Iridium, Starlink), BNetzA issues the operator a single licence, and it covers all user terminals in Germany. The "use it or lose it" principle applies: if within a year the operator has not begun commercial use of the spectrum, the agency may revoke the licence under § 102 TKG.

This example shows that even where the communications market is open and highly competitive, the state fully controls access to the spectrum. No global operator can circumvent these rules by pleading that the technology knows no borders.

4. Space law: state responsibility for the private sector

When it comes to companies such as SpaceX, a natural question arises: is the state responsible for unlawful cross-border data transmission carried out by a commercial entity? The answer lies in international space law.

4.1. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty

In general international law a state is responsible for private persons only when it strictly controls them; space law establishes something different — full attribution. The key document here is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1967 (the Outer Space Treaty).

Article VI of the Treaty establishes: "States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space... whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty."

This means that the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space must be carried out with the authorization and continuing supervision of the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.

4.2. How this norm took shape

Article VI was born of a difficult compromise between the two Cold War superpowers. After the launch of the first satellite, the USSR insisted that space be explored by states alone, with no commerce. The Soviet delegation argued that carrying capitalist exploitation into space was unacceptable. The US, by contrast, pressed for private business (for example, the Comsat corporation) to be admitted on a lawful footing.

Out of the compromise was born the formula "private activity — public responsibility." The state may admit private companies into space, but it assumes all international responsibility for them. Under the classic interpretation of Article VI (proposed in particular by the eminent jurist Bin Cheng) the words "national activities" cover any actions of legal and natural persons under a state's jurisdiction. (Per the source: Interpretation as Creation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, University of Chicago)

There is, however, a subtlety here. Elon Musk's promise to supply Starlink terminals to a conflict zone is in itself the intention of a private person, not an act to which international law assigns a legal characterization. What is legally significant is not the public rhetoric but the actual activity — the launch and operation of the satellite system. It is attributed to a specific state through the concept of the launching state and the registration of the space object in the register kept by the UN Secretary-General, as well as through the state that issued the authorization and exercises supervision under Article VI. That is why the focus of international law is not Musk's statements but the real operation of Starlink and the states behind it. At the ITU, Starlink's notifying administration is Norway, the associated administration the US; both are obliged to ensure that their operator complies with the Radio Regulations.

5. Anatomy of a legal conflict: an analysis of the Starlink-terminals-in-Iran case

The attempt to give Iran satellite communications in the autumn of 2022 set a precedent and laid bare all the contradictions between the capabilities of NGSO, state sovereignty and international law.

5.1. The political and technological context of the blocks

In September 2022 mass protests broke out in Iran, and the authorities suppressed them harshly. To cut the protesters off from one another, prevent them from organizing and stop them from telling the world about the violence (by some estimates thousands died), the regime staged a mass internet shutdown. The blow came from every direction: individual platforms (social networks) were blocked, speed was throttled drastically (throughput fell to as little as 1%), cellular networks were switched off, the radio signal was jammed.

In response to the information blockade, activists and international organizations began smuggling Starlink equipment into Iran. The terminals allowed people to send photos and videos to the outside world, bypassing the networks of Iranian providers.

5.2. General License D-2 of the US Department of the Treasury

To support this legally, the US government took measures under its own domestic legislation. On 23 September 2022 the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury issued an updated General License D-2 for Iran in place of the outdated D-1 of 2014. As of 17 May 2024 its provisions were carried over into 31 CFR § 560.540 ITSR.

General License D-2 was intended to support internet freedom and protection from censorship. It markedly expanded the list of technologies that may be exported to Iran in circumvention of the general sanctions.

A legal paradox. GL D-2 relieved SpaceX and other exporters of liability under US law — the threat of multimillion-dollar fines for violating sanctions. But this domestic act has no force outside the US and does not override the sovereign rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran enshrined in the ITU Radio Regulations. Permitting export is not the same as issuing an international licence to emit radio waves in another country.

5.3. The case before the ITU Radio Regulations Board (RRB)

Once its sovereignty had been violated, the government of Iran turned to the ITU Radio Regulations Board (RRB) and demanded that the unlawful operation of Starlink terminals be stopped. The case dragged on for several years and showed how enforcement works in international telecommunications law. The ITU consolidated the course of the case on a separate public page; the table below is a chronicle of the key meetings of the ITU RRB, from which one can see how the parties' positions shifted.

5.4. An analysis of the "technical impossibility" argument and the shifting of responsibility

The main upshot of the RRB's decisions is that the Board refused to accept the technical arguments of the administrations responsible for Starlink. Norway and the US insisted that, technically, Starlink could not track down all the illegal devices. They also pointed to the user agreement (Terms of Service): there, responsibility for unlawful use rests with the users themselves (the smugglers).

The ITU held that such justifications are legally null. A prohibition in the user agreement does not relieve the operator and the notifying state of the duty to stop the emission. Moreover, precedent had proved that Starlink can itself find and shut down thousands of illegal terminals at once within set geolocation boundaries — when it suits the company or is directly mandated by Western governments.

It follows that the terminals' technical vulnerability is a political lever. The assurances that Iranian laws cannot be complied with were treated as the political will of the US, not as a technical limitation. In the end the ITU required Norway and the US to do everything in their power and compel the operator to switch off services in Iran. In doing so it affirmed the priority not of abstract sovereignty but of international norms that vest in ITU members the right to set the rules for using the radio-frequency spectrum.

6. Communications under disaster conditions: the Tampere Convention

Since classic telecommunications law strictly prohibits interference, the question arises: are there international-law exceptions for regions where war is raging, unrest is seething or a natural catastrophe has struck and people need urgent help? The key document here is the Tampere Convention.

6.1. The mechanisms of the Tampere Convention

The Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (adopted in 1998, entered into force in 2005) was adopted in order to remove the bureaucratic obstacles that hinder the rapid deployment of communications in disaster zones.

The Convention requires States Parties to ease or temporarily lift restrictions on the use of equipment. Such concessions include:

• removal of bans on importing equipment and its expedited customs clearance;
• exemption from frequency-licensing procedures;
• immunity of personnel from arrest and detention;
• protection of equipment from confiscation and requisition;
• exemption from taxes (except VAT) and duties.

Importantly, the Convention covers not only state bodies but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private companies that provide communication resources. To accede, a state delivers an instrument of ratification or accession to the depositary — the UN Secretary-General.

6.2. The categorical priority of sovereignty under disaster conditions

For all its humanitarian thrust, the Tampere Convention does not allow communications assistance to be imposed by force. The text contains firm safeguards protecting state sovereignty.

First, the Convention applies only to serious disruptions of the functioning of society (disasters) — caused by nature, accident or "human activity."

Second, paragraph 5 of Article 4 sets the principal condition: "No telecommunication assistance shall be provided pursuant to this Convention without the consent of the requesting State Party." The requesting state is entitled to decline any assistance offered, at its discretion.

Third, under Article 4 (paragraph 8) and Article 5 (paragraph 7) the assistance is disposed of solely by the receiving state, and all organizations that provide resources are obliged to comply strictly with its laws and not to interfere in its internal affairs.

6.3. Applicability to mass unrest and internet shutdowns

The legal analysis of the Convention makes it clear that it is by no means suited to situations where the communications crisis has been engineered by the government itself — for example, in suppressing protests in Iran or waging a civil war. An authoritarian state, or a government at war with part of its own people, will never ask a UN coordinator to send Starlink terminals in order to circumvent its own blocks. This means that the Tampere Convention gives private companies no right to deploy satellite communications on their own initiative in zones of political and armed conflict.

7. Human rights versus state sovereignty: the humanitarian dimension

The dispute over satellite internet exposes a legal conflict between UN institutions. The ITU proceeds from technical sovereignty over the spectrum, while the human-rights bodies proceed from fundamental freedoms.

7.1. The position of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)

The freedom to seek, receive and impart information is enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Today these rights are inseparable from the internet.

The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has consistently condemned governmental internet shutdowns as an instrument of repression. In the landmark Resolution 32/13 (2016) and subsequent documents (2021) the Council affirmed the principle that "the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online."

The Council calls internet shutdowns indiscriminate and disproportionate measures that fail the three-part test for restrictions (legality, legitimacy, proportionality). Shutdowns cause catastrophic damage to human rights, reaching far beyond freedom of expression. Iran has resorted to such shutdowns repeatedly: during the protests the authorities cut communications time and again, and each time the collapse of the digital infrastructure struck at the right to work (small digital businesses suffered heavy losses) and at the right to health (it was impossible to call an ambulance, telemedicine collapsed, and there were many wounded among the protesters).

The same thing is happening in Sudan: in the war between the regular army (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both sides deliberately shut down the internet as a weapon. In February 2024 RSF fighters seized and cut power to providers' data centres in Khartoum (MTN and Sudani), then disabled Zain's equipment — and severed communications across almost the entire country. Millions of people lost the ability to look for safe routes, receive the money transfers they lived on, and contact humanitarian organizations. As in Iran, the people of Sudan had to resort to smuggled Starlink terminals — even though they are outlawed and carry the threat of arrest.

7.2. The lure of technical solutions and the paralysis of institutions

Seeing the impotence of international law (UN HRC resolutions are non-binding, while real levers stand behind the ITU Radio Regulations), society looks for a way out in technology — in so-called technosolutionism.

The owners of NGSO networks contend that states jam terrestrial channels, but satellite internet knows no borders and will deliver communications immune to censorship. This view loses sight of the very architecture of global governance. The ITU system was built as a neutral, purely technical mechanism for managing the spectrum; it is not designed to assess whether governments' actions are proportionate or whether they violate human rights.

Thus a governance blind spot arises. An authoritarian regime can — lawfully, from the standpoint of international law — jam satellite signals, seize equipment and demand that the US switch off Starlink terminals, relying solely on ITU norms (combating harmful interference, complying with Article 18.1), and so pass off political repression as the technical regulation of the spectrum.

8. Conclusion

The analysis of the legal grounds for global satellite communications in crisis regions allows several conclusions to be drawn:

• Unauthorized communications are unlawful. Under current international telecommunications law, the actual acts of private persons — placing satellite-communication terminals (for example, Starlink) within a sovereign state without the consent of its government — are unlawful. Article 18.1 of the ITU Radio Regulations requires a licence from the host state for any radio-transmitting device, and a satellite terminal is precisely such a device.
• The state answers for the private cosmos. In international law SpaceX is not an independent political actor. Under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the states of jurisdiction (the US and Norway) are directly responsible for ensuring that their private space companies act in accordance with international treaties. The decisions of the ITU Radio Regulations Board directly order these countries to compel the operator to find and switch off the illegal terminals in Iran.
• Sovereignty cannot be circumvented, either by domestic acts or by humanitarian conventions. Neither US domestic legislation (OFAC General License D-2, which lifts national sanctions) nor international disaster-relief agreements override sovereignty. The Tampere Convention states directly: communications assistance may be provided only upon request and with the consent of the host state. This means there is no lawful way to provide communications in defiance of the regime's will, so as to overcome the drive of authoritarian governments to deprive their population of access to reliable information.
• The legal systems are at odds with one another. Between UN institutions there is a legal collision. The UN Human Rights Council sees in state internet shutdowns (Iran, Sudan, Bangladesh) a gross violation of fundamental freedoms and of humanitarian law. Yet the ITU instruments that regulate the radio-frequency spectrum remain on the side of the state and take no account of the human-rights agenda.

Until an assessment of proportionality and human rights is built into the system of global governance of the radio-frequency spectrum, the attempts of technology corporations to rescue people in conflict zones will remain, on the international stage, an act of civil disobedience: justified from the standpoint of human rights, but in breach of certain specific norms of international agreements.